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chapter 1 0
When Having Too Much Power Is Harmful
Spinoza on Political Luck
Yitzhak Y. Melamed
10.1 Introduction
Spinoza’s celebrated doctrine of the conatus asserts that “each thing, as far
as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being” (E3p6).1 Shortly
thereafter, Spinoza makes the further claim that the (human) mind strives
to increase its power of acting [potentia agendi] (E3p12).2 This latter claim is
commonly interpreted as asserting that human beings (and their associa-
tions) not only strive to persevere in their existence, but also always strive to
increase their power.3 Spinoza’s justiﬁcation for E3p12 relies (among others)
on E3p6. For this reason, it seems reasonable that we strive to increase our
1 For an illuminating discussion of the conatus doctrine, see Garrett, “Spinoza’s Conatus Argument.”
Unless otherwise marked, all quotes from Spinoza’s works and letters are from Curley’s translation.
I have relied on Gebhardt’s critical edition (Spinoza Opera, 4 volumes [Heidelberg: Carl Winter
Verlag, 1925]) for the Latin and Dutch text of Spinoza. I would like to thank Daniel Dragicevic, Zach
Gartenberg, Avreimi Rot, Hasana Sharp, and the anonymous referee for their most helpful com-
ments on previous drafts of this paper. An early version of the paper has been presented at the Chinese
National Conference in Early Modern Philosophy at Renmin University, Beijing, in June 2017.
I would like to thank the audience for the questions and comments.
2 “E3p12: The Mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the Body’s
power of acting. Dem.: So long as the human Body is affected with a mode that involves the nature of
an external body, the humanMind will regard the same body as present (by IIP17) and consequently
(by IIP7) so long as the humanMind regards some external body as present, i.e. (by IIP17S), imagines
it, the human Body is affected with a mode that involves the nature of that external body. Hence, so
long as the Mind imagines those things that increase or aid our body’s power of acting, the Body is
affected withmodes that increase or aid its power of acting (see Post. 1), and consequently (by P11) the
Mind’s power of thinking is increased or aided. Therefore (by P6 or P9), the Mind, as far as it can,
strives to imagine those things, q.e.d.”
3 See, Della Rocca, Spinoza, 155–58. Spinoza’s notion of power is closely related to that of virtue (see
E4d8). There is also some evidence that he understood power as closely related to the notion of
efﬁcient cause. In E1p34d Spinoza relies on the claims that God’s essence is the cause of himself
(E1p11), and that God’s essence is the cause of all things (E1p16c1) to infer that God’s essence is the
locus of its power. The argument of E1p34d seems to assume that (efﬁcient) causation is power (CM
II 12| I/280/25).We should also note that Spinoza is highly critical of vulgar conceptions of divine and
natural power. Thus, in the sixth chapter of the TTP, he mocks those who “imagine God’s power as
the rule of a certain Royal majesty, whereas they imagine nature’s power as force and impulse [vim &
impetum]” (III/81/22).
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power because havingmore power is likely to help us persevere in our being.
The more power we have, the less likely we are to be out-powered by
external causes that may conﬂict with our striving for persevering in our
existence. The logic here is quite sound. Insofar as human beings are mere
ﬁnite modes, i.e. entities whose existence is not guaranteed by their mere
essence,4 and are distinct from other ﬁnite modes with whom we interact
in various manners, it would seem that our striving for power should be
insatiable.5 No ﬁnite degree of power can ever guarantee the continuation
of our existence.6 For this reason, it would seem that increasing our power
is always good. Indeed, in E4p8d, Spinoza seems to deﬁne good and evil as
“what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting.”
Having this sound logic in mind, we should be taken aback by a brief
note Spinoza makes in passing in the seventh chapter of the Political
Treatise. In this passage, Spinoza seems to assert that the stability of a
state – which is one of the chief political virtues for Spinoza7 – is a function
of having just the right degree of power, not less, but also, not more. The
passage seems to imply that having too much power might be detrimental
to the state. But how can such a view be consistent with Spinoza’s assertion
and approval of our constant “will to power” in the Ethics?
In this chapter I will explain the tension between these two strands in
Spinoza’s thought, and attempt to reconcile them. I will begin with a close
examination of the passage from the seventh chapter of the TP, and its
apparent contrast with Spinoza’s claim in the Ethics about our striving to
increase our power of acting. I will then turn, in the second section, to
consider whether Spinoza’s claims in TP, ch. 7 – a chapter dedicated to the
exploration of the nature of nontyrannical monarchy – are valid only with
regard to a monarchic state, or whether we may generalize the claim that
4 E1p24: “The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.” On the distinction
between the esse of substance and that of modes, see Schechter, Existence and Temporality, 61–62.
On the identity of God’s essence and existence, see Melamed, “Spinoza’s Deiﬁcation of Existence.”
5 Della Rocca, Spinoza, 172: “the threats are many and diverse and it is in our own interest to accumulate
as much power as possible to be able to meet these various threats when they occur. There is, as we
might say, no telling which ability, which power, may come in handy, and so our striving to persevere
ourselves dictates that we strive to acquire as much power as possible.” Italics added.
6 See E4p3: “The force [vis] by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and inﬁnitely surpassed by the
power of external causes. Dem.: This is evident from A1 [‘There is no singular thing in nature than
which there is not another more powerful and stronger. Whatever one is given, there is another more
powerful by which the ﬁrst can be destroyed.’]. For given a man, there is something else, say A, more
powerful. And given A, there is something else again, say B, more powerful than A, and so on, to
inﬁnity. Therefore, the power of man is limited by the power of another thing and inﬁnitely
surpassed by the power of external causes, q.e.d.”
7 See, for example, TP, ch. 1| III/275/28) and ch. 6 (III/307/5). Stability, however, is not the sole, or even
the most valuable political virtue. See TP, ch. 6| III/298/14–25.
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having too much power might be harmful to other forms of the state or
even other kinds of individuals. In the third and ﬁnal section I will attempt
to solve the tension between Spinoza’s apparently conﬂicting claims by
looking more closely at his construal of human power, and its political
dimensions.
10.2 Can a State Have Too Much Power?
Spinoza’s aims in the Tractatus Politicus seem to be more ambitious than in
the Theological Political Treatise (1670). For the most part, the two works
are close in spirit. Having been written about a decade apart, the TP is an
attempt to rework the political parts of the TTP while mostly avoiding the
discussion of scripture that clearly alarmedmany of the readers of the TTP.
There are, however, some signiﬁcant differences between the two treatises.
In the TP, Spinoza’s attitude toward the common people is much less
negative and more ambivalent than in the TTP. In the TP, Spinoza
frequently refers to the common people – living in a nondespotic com-
monwealth – as a “free multitude [libera multitudo],”8 a term that would be
hardly intelligible in the context of the TTP, and its highly disparaging
attitude toward the “vulgus.” Still, the most signiﬁcant difference between
the two works seems to be the systematic ambition of the TP.
At the beginning of his discussion of the Hebrew State, in the seven-
teenth chapter of the TTP, Spinoza notes: “I do not intend to show how
a state could be formed so that it might, in spite of everything, always be
preserved securely” (III/203/5). In contrast, in the TP, Spinoza argues that
since the fundamental laws he suggests
[a]gree both with reason and with the common affect of men, we can
maintain that if any state [imperia] is eternal [aeterna],9 this one must be
eternal, or that it can’t be destroyed by any inherent defect, but only by some
inevitable fate.10
Though the passage refers speciﬁcally to aristocracy, I tend to believe that
the aim of the TP was to suggest fundamental laws that will run the state, as
if it were a political perpetuum mobile, for all three kinds of civil order:
8 See, for example, TP, ch. 5 (III/297/5), and ch. 7 (III/319/19).
9 I have slightly altered Curley’s translation, which renders “aeterna” as everlasting. See Spinoza’s
claim that the fundamental laws of nontyrannical aristocracy must be permanent, so that an attempt
to change those laws would count as treason (TP, ch. 8| III/334/12)
10 TP, ch. 10| III/357/13–16. Italics added.
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monarchy,11 aristocracy, and democracy. In the TP, Spinoza’s discussion of
all three forms of government is highly systematic, and the concern for the
establishment of a political system that will not require regular corrections
is stated frequently throughout the work.12
Having brieﬂy discussed these general features of the TP, let us turn now
to our main topic. Both in the TTP and the TP Spinoza is mostly critical of
the reliance and use of mercenaries and paid soldiers,13 and advocates
instead the creation of a citizens’ army.14 An army of citizens may restrain
the capricious ambitions of the military commander, and is much less
likely to collaborate with a tyrant in the repression of citizens.15 In contrast,
the hiring of mercenaries “lays the foundation for an eternal warfare.”16
Along these lines, Spinoza notes in the seventh chapter of the TP:
Next, professional soldiers, accustomed to military discipline, and used to
putting up with being cold and without food, usually scorn the crowd of
citizens as far inferior to themselves: they couldn’t storm a city or ﬁght in
open Battle. But no one of sound mind will say that for that reason the state
is less successful or stable. On the contrary, no fair judge will deny that the
most stable state is one which has enough power to defend its own possessions, but
not enough to seek those of others [quod parta tantùm tueri, nec aliena appetere
potest], and which for that reason tries in every way to avoid war and to preserve
peace.17
Notice that at the beginning of the passage, Spinoza accepts the claim that
citizen soldiers are inferior to mercenaries in their ability to “storm a city or
ﬁght in open battle.” He only objects to the further conclusion that – due
to the relative physical weakness of citizen soldiers – the state is better off
relying on an army of mercenaries. In fact, Spinoza argues, the relative
weakness of the citizen soldiers (in comparison with mercenaries) contri-
butes to the stability and well-being of the state. The wording of the last
sentence in the passage makes clear that having just the right degree of
power – enough to defend the state, but not enough to pursue the land of
other states – is essential to the stability of the state.18 Spinoza could have
argued that having a citizens’ army is an unavoidable evil (insofar as it
11 In one passage in his discussion of his plan for a nontyrannical monarchy in the TP, Spinoza
describes this commonwealth too as “eternal [aeterna].” See TP, ch. 7| III/318/33.
12 See, for example, TP, ch. 5 (III/295/17–31) and ch. 8 (III/343/14–16).
13 For a notable exception, see TP, ch. 8 (III/327/11–19).
14 See TTP, ch. 17 (III/212–213) and TP, ch. 7 (III/313/1). 15 TTP, ch. 17| III/213/9–13.
16 TP, ch. 7| III/313/5. 17 TP, ch. 7|III/320/19–28. Italics added.
18 In theDiscourses, Machiavelli considers and eventually rejects a similar view because “it is impossible
to adjust the balance so nicely as to keep things exactly to this middle course” (Discourses, I 6, p. 123
in Walker’s translation).
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compromises the military strength of the state), and that this modest evil
should be nevertheless preferred over the worse evil of a mercenary army,
which could be easily turned by the ruler against the states’ citizens. Yet,
this is not his argument in the passage. The relative weakness of a citizens’
army is presented in this passage as a clear positive quality of the state.
In fact, Spinoza’s formulation of the last sentence of the passage as a general
rule implies that even if we have to choose between having a citizens’ army
that is so strong that it can easily “seek the possession” of the neighboring
states and having a citizens’ army that can only defend “its own possessions
but not seek the possessions” of other states, we should still clearly prefer
the latter option.
Why does Spinoza advise us not to have an army that is too strong?
Spinoza does not elaborate much on this issue, but the very words that
conclude the passage seem to provide the outline of the required explana-
tion: “and which for that reason tries in every way to avoid war and to
preserve peace.” Wars undermine the stability of the state. But why does
Spinoza think that having a very strong army is likely to cause war?
Perhaps, a strong army is the best assurance for peace and stability?
Spinoza’s text does not answer our last questions, but I think that given
Spinoza’s notorious adherence to realpolitik,19 we could conﬁdently answer
these questions.
A signiﬁcant and salient misbalance of power between neighboring
states creates a hard-to-resist temptation for the sovereign of the stronger
state (no matter whether the sovereign is a monarch, an aristocratic
council, or the body of all citizens). The stronger state has the power to
conquer the weaker, neighbor, state (or at least so it would appear to the
sovereign of the stronger state). Since, for Spinoza, international relations
among states are almost the same as the relations between individuals in the
state of nature,20 the strong state has no obligation to refrain from con-
quering and plundering a weak neighbor. Of course, were the sovereign of
the strong state to act strictly rationally, she should avoid war, knowing the
costs of war to the overall well-being of the state: running an occupation
19 See, for example, TP, ch. 8 (III/333/1): “No one defends another’s cause except insofar as he believes
that he thereby makes his own situation more stable.” For a helpful discussion of Spinoza’s
realpolitik, see Curley, “Kissinger, Spinoza, and Genghis Khan.”
20 “[S]ince (by iii, 2) the Right of the supreme power is nothing more than the Right itself of nature, it
follows that two states are related to one another as two men are in the state of nature, with one
exception. A Commonwealth can take precautions against being overpowered by another
Commonwealth. But a man in the state of nature – a man burdened daily with sleep, often with
illness or grief, and in the end with old age – that man can’t provide security for himself against
being overpowered by another man.” TP, ch. 3| III/289/17–23.
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regime, or deporting or exterminating the natives of the conquered state
are all options that may seem worthwhile at ﬁrst, but in the long run they
are very likely to put the state under stern economic and political pressures
that will constantly threaten and undermine its authority.21 A smart and
rational sovereign would avoid conquering a much weaker neighboring
state for reasons of pure long-term self-interest, but the political mechanism
Spinoza aims to establish in the TP is explicitly designed to deal with human
beings of ﬂesh and blood that are rational to a degree, but are also swayed by
passions to at least an equal degree.22 It is precisely the partial rationality of
human beings that the political architect must assume. Just as the political
architect must presume that some members of the state are not going to
act in good faith in the absence of compulsory measures,23 so must the
architect assume that on some occasions the sovereignmight be tempted by
the prospect of short-termmilitary victories, which will cost the state dearly
in the long run. For this reason, Spinoza suggests that we avoid creating
signiﬁcant misbalance of power among neighboring states, since in the
long run such a misbalance is likely to tempt the stronger state to attack
and conquer the weaker states. Of course, none of this implies that the state
should not take great precautions to defend itself. On the contrary, the very
same consideration should motivate the state not to become weaker than
its neighbors (i.e. not to count on the good intentions and benevolence of
the neighboring states, and thus not create a reality that might tempt the
neighbor to invade).
At the beginning of this chapter, we encountered Spinoza’s claim that
we always strive to increase our power of acting and our power of thinking
(E3p12). At least, on ﬁrst notice, this claim could be plausibly read as
similar to Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power, i.e. as an afﬁrmation
21 “The power and Right of the Commonwealth are diminished to the extent it provides many people
with reason to conspire against it . . . Like each individual citizen, or like a man in the state of nature,
the greater the reason for fear it has, the less it is its own master.” TP, ch. 3| III/288/16.
22 See Spinoza’s critique of the “philosophers” who “believe they perform a godly act and reach the
pinnacle of wisdomwhen they’ve learned how to praise in many ways a human nature which doesn’t
exist anywhere, and how to bewail the way men really are. They conceive men not as they are, but as
they want them to be. That’s why for the most part they’ve written Satire instead of Ethics, and why
they’ve never conceived a Politics which could be put to any practical application, but only one
which would be thought a Fantasy, possible only in Utopia, or in the golden age of the Poets, where
there’d be absolutely no need for it.” TP, ch. 1| III/273/8–17.
23 “A state whose well-being depends on someone’s good faith, and whose affairs can’t be properly
looked after unless the people who handle them are willing to act in good faith, won’t be stable at all.
For it to be able to last, its affairs must be so ordered that, whether the people who administer
them are led by reason or by an affect, they can’t be induced to be disloyal or to act badly.” TP, ch. 1|
III/275/26–31.
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and approval of our constant striving to increase our power.24 But if an
increase of power is essentially and always good, how could Spinoza argue
in TP, ch. 7, that sometimes having too much power is, in fact, detrimental
to the state.
Before we turn to address possible solutions to our problem, let us ﬁrst
consider the precise scope of Spinoza’s claim that “the most stable state is
one which has enough power to defend its own possessions, but not
enough to seek those of others.”
10.3 Generalizing Spinoza’s Claims in TP, Ch. 7
Spinoza presents the claim that the most stable state is one that is capable of
defending its own possessions, but not of seeking those of others in the
context of his discussion of the proper constitution of a nontyrannical
monarchy in the seventh chapter of the TP. An obvious question that
immediately arises is whether these claims of Spinoza pertain only to
monarchy, or also to the two other civil orders discussed in the TP, i.e.
aristocracy and democracy. This is not a trivial question since at least in one
case – Spinoza’s advocacy in favor of an ofﬁcial national religion that
appears in the context of his discussion of aristocracy25 – some scholars
tend to believe that these claims do not apply in the case of the other two
civil orders.26 Furthermore, the fact that Spinoza died in the midst of
writing the chapter on democracy, and that the extant part is most likely no
more than a quarter of the planned chapter, constitutes another obstacle
for deriving any solid conclusion on the present issue.
On the other hand, there are issues that are discussed in the context of
one of the civic orders while it is clear that the same claims apply mutatis
mutandis to the other civic orders as well. Consider, for example, Spinoza’s
claim – in his discussion of aristocracy – that judges “should never be
permitted to use torture to force anyone to confess.”27 Earlier in the TP, in
chapter 3, Spinoza argues that human nature is averse to self-recrimination
24 Nietzsche, Werke, Vol. VIII (Der Wille zur Macht: I. Buch: Der Antichirist), 218 (§2). See Della
Rocca, Spinoza, 295: “Spinoza extols the will to power as much as (perhaps more than) as Nietzsche
does.” Compare Hobbes, Leviathan, I 11: “In the ﬁrst place, I put for a general inclination of all
mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death.”
25 TP, ch. 8| III/345/10–28.
26 See Curley’s editorial notes, in Collected Works, II 543, n. 40. Curley notes, however, that “it is not
clear why Spinoza makes this distinction.” Curley refers to TP, ch. 7 (III/319/11–23) as proving that
Spinoza’s model of monarchy excludes national religion. I very much doubt this text indeed
supports that conclusion.
27 TP, ch. 7| III/342/27.
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and torture, and that for this reason it would be foolish for the common-
wealth to use these measures.28 Thus, in spite of Spinoza’s silence on the
issue of torture in his discussions of monarchy and democracy, the passage
in chapter 3 makes clear that Spinoza’s objection to the use of torture
applies equally to all three civic orders.
Let us return now to our original question of whether Spinoza’s claim
that the state might be better off not having too much power could be
generalized to all three forms of civic order. While the text of the TP does
not seem to provide conclusive support for either a positive or negative
answer to this question, I tend to think that Spinoza’s claims in chapter 7
should be generalized for two main reasons. First, Spinoza formulates his
words in chapter 7 as a general claim, and nothing in the context of this
passage indicates that it is restricted merely to the case of monarchy.
Second, the reasoning that motivates Spinoza’s claim in TP, ch. 7 – at
least if we accept the reconstruction of the reasoning I have offered –
applies equally well to the cases of aristocracy and democracy. Aristocratic
and democratic states may just as well be tempted by the excess of their
power, and the facility of conquering a neighboring state. True, Spinoza
thinks that democratic states have a tendency toward peace.29 Yet, human
nature does not change in democracy, and if the misbalance of power is
signiﬁcant enough, the temptation to seek the possessions of the weak
neighboring state would be equally strong, and thus annul the natural
peaceful tendency of the democratic state.
Let us move now one step ahead and ask whether other individuals,
apart from states, could be better off not having the maximal degree of
power.30 Is it, for example, the case that my well-being and felicity is
a function of having just the right amount of power, i.e. enough to defend
my possessions but not enough to seek the possessions of others? At least at
ﬁrst sight, it would seem that the case of individual human beings should
be different from that of independent states. My share of power is regulated
by the state that grants me certain rights/powers.31 In contrast, indepen-
dent states are not part of any international body that regulates the
distribution of power among states; recall that for Spinoza the relationship
between states is virtually the same as between human beings in the state of
28 TP, ch. 3| III/287/25–27. 29 TP, ch. 7 |III/310/8.
30 In TP, ch. 2 (III/278/30), Spinoza reminds the reader that human beings, just like all other
individuals, strive to persevere in their being.
31 For Spinoza’s claim that one’s right extends as far as one’s right does, see ch. 16 (III/189/25); TP, ch. 2
(III/277/7–8), ch. 7 (III/314/28), ch. 9 (III/347/20); Ep. 50 (IV/239/23).
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nature.32 Still, one may wonder why this difference between individual
human beings and states should count as a reason to hold that for human
beings, unlike states, having more power is always beneﬁcial. Perhaps, one
may even argue in the following, opposite, manner. If states, which are in
a state of nature and as such have no superior sovereign that is supposed to
impose peace between them and guarantee their safety, are still sometimes
better-off not having maximal power, it would seem that a fortiori, human
beings that enjoy the security and peace imposed by the sovereign would be
even better off without having maximal power (under certain circum-
stances). States have better reasons to be mutually suspicious and anxious
(than citizens of a well-governed state), and if, in spite of these mutual
threats, we admit that at least sometimes states are better off without
maximal power, it would seem that individual citizens whose security is
mostly guaranteed by the sovereign should have even better reasons not to
act anxiously, and thus be better-off not having too much power, which
might tempt them to foolish, aggressive, actions.
The back and forth arguments in the last page can, and should, be
further developed if we are to reach any robust answer to our question.
Still, I think it is fair to say that it is not trivially clear that Spinoza’s claims
in TP, ch. 7, cannot be generalized to the cases of other individuals, besides
the state. With these modest and tentative conclusions, we will wind up
our discussion of the scope of Spinoza’s claims in TP, ch. 7. In the
following, ﬁnal, section of the chapter, we will attempt to resolve the
tension between Spinoza’s claims in TP, ch. 7, and those of the Ethics
(E3p12).
10.4 Four Possible Solutions
In this section, I would like to consider some possible solutions to the
tension between Spinoza’s claim (in TP, ch. 7) that having toomuch power
could be detrimental to the state, and his claims in E3p12 that we always
strive to increase our power of action, and that any increase in our power of
acting is, by deﬁnition, good.33
The ﬁrst solution I would like to consider suggests that in TP, ch. 7,
Spinoza does notmake any claim about havingmore or less power [potentia],
but rather about having one ability, rather than the other. The passage
32 TP, ch. 3| III/290/1.
33 See E4p8d: “We call good, or evil, what is useful to, or harmful to, preserving our being (by D1 and
D2), i.e. (by IIIP7), what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting.”
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translated by Curley as “[the most stable state is one] which has enough
power to defend its possessions, but not enough to seek those of others,”
reads in Latin: “quod parta tantum tueri, nec aliena appetere potest.”34 The
Latin does not contain, indeed, the noun “potentia,” and the passage could
just as well be translated by: “[the most stable state is one] which is capable of
defending its possessions, but not of seeking those of others.”35
Still, in spite of the fact that “potentia” is not explicitly stated in the
Latin, the content and context of the sentence makes clear that the most
stable state has a certain degree of capability, not more, but also not less.
We are not dealing here with two unrelated abilities, but rather with one
ability that is stronger than the other: a state that is capable of seeking the
possessions of other countries is clearly capable of defending its own
possessions. A difference in the degree of one’s capabilities seems to me
quite clearly a difference in one’s power, and thus even though the plain
Latin does not include the noun “potentia,” I think Curley’s translation
reﬂects well the content of the sentence as a whole.
The second “solution” I will consider is not truly a solution, but rather
an admission that the tension between Spinoza’s claims in TP, ch. 7 and in
E3p12 results from irreconcilable, opposite, strands of Spinoza’s philoso-
phy. Tensions and sometimes even ﬂat contradictions do occur in the
works of good philosophers. The fact that the tension here does not result
from conﬂicting claims in the context of the same discussion, nor indeed
even in the same work, may give even more credence to this, somewhat
desperate, suggestion. Still, I think we should not rush to accept this
conclusion. As Della Rocca rightly pointed out, Spinoza was a highly
systematic philosopher;36 he clearly invested much effort in trying to
clean his system from inconsistencies.37 It is also worth noting that the
TP and the Ethics represent more or less the same late stage38 in the
development of Spinoza’s philosophy, and thus it is not very likely that
the claims of the TP indicate that Spinoza withdrew from his assertions in
34 TP, ch. 7| III/314/11–12.
35 Compare Wernham’s translation (Spinoza, Political Works, 361): “[No state is more stable to the
impartial eye than one] which is just powerful enough to preserve its own possessions, without being
able to covet those of others.”
36 Della Rocca, “Interpreting Spinoza,” 535.
37 Spinoza’s writings are frequently quite polemical. In many cases, the primary objects of Spinoza’s
criticism are his own views in his earlier period. See, for example, TP, ch. 8 (III/319/24–320/18), which
are clearly targeting Spinoza’s own claims in E4p54s (II/250/17).
38 The TP was written in the last year, or year and half, of Spinoza’s life. Spinoza worked on the Ethics
for almost two decades (roughly, from 1660 till his death in February 1677). Still, for all we know, the
version of the Ethics published in the 1677 Opera Posthuma represents his views in his very late
period.
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the Ethics. Thus, I would not completely rule out this solution, but rather
keep it only as an option of last resort.
The third solution suggests that Spinoza is somewhat equivocating in his
use of the terminology of “power [potentia].” Thus, one may argue that for
the state to have more power in one sense is not the same as having more
power in a different sense. Therefore, if one sense of “having power” is just
having military power (call it: M-Power), and another sense of “having
power” is having the most secure existence, all things considered (call it:
G-Power), then Spinoza’s claims in TP, ch. 7, should be interpreted as
stating that the most stable state must have just the right amount of
M-Power, no more and no less, but he may well still hold that the state
is always better off having more G-Power, and that it is not the case that the
most stable state is one which has just the right amount of G-Power. Per
our deﬁnition of G-Power, the state must become more secure by having
more G-Power.
The main problem I ﬁnd with this solution is that at least at ﬁrst sight we
have no textual evidence showing that Spinoza consciously drew such
a conclusion. Still, I suspect this suggestion puts the ﬁnger on something
essentially right, and it is likely that in TP, ch. 7, Spinoza used “power” in
its more colloquial sense, while the discussions of power in the Ethics are
more restricted to Spinoza’s philosophical explication of power. Let me
turn then to the fourth solution, which could be considered as a variant of
the third, and might have good textual support.
Our fourth and last solution begins with the observation that neither in
E3p12 nor in any other passage in the Ethics39 does Spinoza argue that we
always strive to have more power simpliciter. Instead, E3p12 – and the
propositions that rely on it – argue that we strive to increase our power of
acting [potentia agendi]. But, what is a “power of acting”? A possible answer
to this question appeals to a crucial distinction Spinoza introduces in E3d2:
I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are
the adequate cause, i.e. (by D1), when something in us or outside us follows
from our nature, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it
alone. On the other hand, I say that we are acted on when something happens
in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause.
(Italics added.)
In E3d1, Spinoza deﬁnes an adequate cause as a cause “whose effect can be
clearly and distinctly perceived through it.”A thing is said to act, according
39 Or, to the best of my knowledge, in any other passage in Spinoza’s writing.
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to E3d2, when the nature, or essence, of the thing can fully explain what
happens to the thing or to something else. Given this deﬁnition of action,
we may suggest that “power of acting” is just the ability to be the adequate
cause of something that happens in us or outside us. In other words, the
more power of acting we have, the more our essence provides the explana-
tion for what is happening to us and our surroundings.40 Since part of
Spinoza’s deﬁnition of freedom is “being determined to act by itself alone”
(E1d7), we may further add that an increase in our power of acting is also
an increase in our freedom.41 Power of acting may thus indicate a certain
degree of causal autonomy, or self-determination.42
Let us now return to the case of the state that has enough power to
defend its own possessions but not enough power to seek the possessions of
its neighbors. When the state increases its power by subordinating a
neighboring state, it will in all likelihood produce a strong resentment
and hatred by the population of the subordinated state. In so doing, the
powerful state becomes more dependent upon the subordinate population.
It must allocate signiﬁcant resources in order to secure itself from the threat
of rebellion and violent reaction by the subordinated population. Did the
powerful state increase its power of action by occupying the new territories?
The occupying state must now allocate huge resources – which would
otherwise be used for the well-being of its citizens – in order to arm itself,
recruit bribed collaborators among the occupied population, and create
a regime of spies, prisons, electronic surveillance, military tribunals, inter-
nal and external propaganda agencies, and so forth (this is a very rudimen-
tary list of the requirements of running a well-functioning occupation
regime). It would be thus quite difﬁcult to make the case that occupying
new lands made the state any more independent, or increased its power of
acting. Every rebellion, or intifada, by the subordinated people is likely to
tank the economy of the subordinating state. Thus, the state that is too
40 Viljanen, Spinoza’s Geometry of Power, 81.
41 In the “General Deﬁnition of the Affects” section at the conclusion of part III of the Ethics, Spinoza
identiﬁes the body’s power of acting with its “force of existing [vis existendi]” (II/204/12).
Presumably, a thing with a higher degree of causal autonomy depends less for its existence on
something else, and therefore has more “force of existing.”
42 At this point we may raise the following objection. Spinoza’s discussion of our striving to increase
our power of acting in E3p12d makes clear that even an external cause may increase our power of
acting.Would that not contradict our explanation of the power of acting as the ability to provide the
adequate explanation for what happens to us? No. Our power of acting indicates indeed the degree
to which we are causally autonomous. However, insofar as we are not substances (E2p10), we cannot
avoid being caused from outside. Thus, the state and properties of our bodies and minds – including
our degree of causal autonomy – are at least partly caused from outside, but this does contradict the
claim that we can have more or less of our states explained through our nature.
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powerful in terms of Spinoza’s discussion in TP, ch. 7, might have, in fact,
less power of acting, and the apparent contradiction between the two texts
seems to be resolved.
Having presented a solution to the problem that stands at the center of
this chapter, let me note that for Spinoza our striving to increase power of
acting has clear limitations. Our striving is always limited by our particular
nature: “a man neither strives to do, nor desires, anything unless it can
follow from his given nature. So no man desires that there be predicated of
him any power of acting, or (what is the same) virtue, which is peculiar to
another’s nature and alien to his own” (E3p55cd). My striving to increase
my power of acting is not a striving to be like God, or achieve a virtue
peculiar to God. Insofar as our nature is so vastly different from God,43 my
striving to be like God is not any better than my striving to become a
rhombus.
10.5 Conclusion
In the current chapter, we have studied closely Spinoza’s surprising claim
in the seventh chapter of the TP that the most stable state is one that has
just the right amount of power: enough to defend its own possessions, but
not enough to seek those of others. In the ﬁrst section, we explained the
reasoning motivating this claim. In the second section, we showed that
though Spinoza presents this claim in the context of his discussion of
monarchy, they should be equally valid with regards to other civic orders,
and perhaps also with regards to other individuals, apart from the state.
In the last section of the chapter we addressed the tension between
Spinoza’s claim in TP, ch. 7, and his assertion in the Ethics that we always
strive to increase our power of acting (E3p12), and that any increase in our
power of acting is, by deﬁnition, good (E4p8d). We considered several
solutions to this problem, and eventually suggested that, for Spinoza,
“power of acting” denotes the causal self-sufﬁciency of a thing. When
speaking – in TP, ch. 7 – about a state that has enough power to defend its
possession but not enough to pursue those of others, Spinoza seems to be
using “power” in its more colloquial sense. For this reason, we suggested
there is no genuine contradiction between Spinoza’s claims in TP, ch. 7
and in the Ethics, since the state that has too much power has in fact less
“power of acting”; it is more dependent upon others.
43 See Melamed, “Crescas and Spinoza on Actual Inﬁnity,” 214.
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Having just the right degree of power seems to be a very delicate
business. Moreover, it seems to make much of the felicity of a state: a
matter of political luck. This observation, however, should not surprise us,
as Spinoza openly describes the success of the ancient Hebrew state,
Spinoza’s “Divine Republic,” as due mostly to “God’s external aid,” i.e.
fortune.44 Along the very same lines, he notes that if not for the womanish
nature of the Jewish religion, he would believe that under certain circum-
stances, or fortune, they will reestablish their state.45
44 TTP, ch. 3| III/48/1. On Spinoza’s reconstruction of the ancient Hebrew republic, see Melamed,
“Spinoza’s Respublica divina.”
45 TTP, ch. 3| III/57/2–5.
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